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FOREWORD

The U.S. armed forces have engaged in a number of
military operations other than war since the Vietnam War.
The latest of these are Kosovo and East Timor. None of these
conflicts has conformed to traditional wars. These conflicts
are not the continuation of diplomacy by other means.
Diplomacy and military action co-exist in the modern
theater of war. Another type of involvement is that similar
to the intervention in Macedonia—where foreign troops
have been inserted to prevent the breakout of fighting.
These types of conflicts do not contain the certainties that
accompanied World Wars I and II. Here, success and failure
are more ambiguous. It may be said that the end-state of
hostilities may not have been achieved in any of these
places. Macedonia remains at risk given the high level of
ethnic tensions. None of these places is peaceful.
The author of this monograph provides us with a new
way of thinking about peace and how to achieve it. Peace, he
argues, arrives only when domestically centered progress is
established in a post-conflict environment. The end of
hostilities is only the end of the shooting. It is not the end of
danger. It is not the end of the animosities or typically the
conditions leading to the hostilities. As a result, the end of
hostilities represents the beginning of a transition to
peace—not peace itself.
The military role of intervening states and organizations
(U.S., NATO, U.N.) continues after the end of hostilities.
They must begin the transition to peace. Unconditional
disarmament of all combatants is a military task. So, the
author argues, is the beginning of the process whereby
progress is instituted. He likens governance to riding a
bicycle. Intervening states can set a rider on a bicycle on day
one after the end of hostilities: elections accomplish this.
They can even help the rider maintain balance. But
successful governance will require the rider to pedal
v

independently. Only then is governance stable. Many
factors can interfere with that stability. Pre-hostility
leadership and combatants may claim the spoils of
war—control of national government. Furthermore, if these
forces are reconstituted as the police or similar entity, then
moderate voices are likely not to be heard. After all, the
former combatants are probably the most ideologically
dedicated and organized among the local groups. Only the
military can prevent this from happening.
Residents of the territory or country must be convinced
to establish new lives at the local level before being allowed
to establish or re-establish national institutions. Here is
where much of the author’s originality will be found. He
argues that a peaceful society will, in fact, experience
considerable conflict. It takes the form of competition
among all sectors of the society: political, religious, civic, as
well as marketplace competition. As in the United States,
that competition will lead to new knowledge and greater
freedom. The concrete expression of freedom is progress.
From this process may come a new leadership not vested in
continuing the earlier conflict. It is the only way to prevent
old leadership from re-exerting itself.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this
study as a contribution to thinking about how the sources of
freedom, progress, stability and peacemaking should factor
into future conflict termination strategies.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Interim Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Modern hostilities feature military action as an adjunct
to diplomacy or as an active tool of diplomacy. The task of
achieving peace after such hostilities is perhaps more
difficult than it was in the past. Diplomatic considerations
often place many players at both the war and peace tables,
or at least in the room. Then there is the very question of
what the constituents of peace may be. Experience teaches
us that the end of hostilities is not peace. At the end of this
monograph, I suggest that the peace achieved in Europe
after World War II still has many fragile elements to it. My
contention is that peace can come only after the salience of
pre-hostility ideologies, desires, and tendencies has been
minimized. This applies to both conventional wars and
military operations other than war that bring intervention
from the United States, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO), United Nations (U.N.), or other groups.
As we move into the 21st century, this century appears
to be telling us that the future, typical war will be more like
the Somalian, Bosnian, or Kosovar conflicts than the World
Wars of this century. Religious, cultural, or ethnic
animosities are more likely to bring on war than the search
for Lebensraum or resources. Troops may be sent into such
conflicts to separate the combatants. But once separated,
are the combatants then at peace? No.
What is peace? It is an internal state of nations or groups
that are achieving progress and are maintaining normal,
noncombatant relations with their neighbors, both internal
and external. Peace requires rejection of the earlier path
that led to the conflict requiring intervention. After war and
after military operations other than war, the military’s role
is to point the combatant groups away from their original
1

path and toward more peaceful pursuits. They, like the
Kosovars in Kosovo today, may act on the belief that control
of a territory is now theirs after the intervening force has
removed the oppressor. That may be a logical outcome of the
end of hostilities, but it is not a good beginning for a lasting
peace or nation-building. For peace to be lasting, nations
and peoples must adopt new strategies to accomplish their
goals.
The Post-Hostilities Context.
We can think of the people in the Balkans, the Horn of
Africa, Central Africa, and maybe in the crescent under
Russia as engaged in battles among two or more
monopolies. The aim of politicians and then combatants is to
eliminate anything that does not serve their own monopoly,
be it ethnic, religious, or nationalistic. An intervening force
may assist one monopoly to push aside the other monopoly.
In the end, one monopoly is left standing. Should that
monopoly take power and rule the territory or nation? I
suggest that its leadership is not likely to be well-suited to
the task. Once in power, I suspect that its strong prejudices
will cause the leaders to ignore the practical needs of
reconstruction and development. The leadership’s power is
based on having the conflict remain salient. Thus, the
intervening force must reduce the power of this monopoly
with as much vigor as they applied to the elimination of the
aggressor monopoly. Substitution of one for the other will
not contribute to the territory’s development—a requirement if it is not to become a ward state.
The logic behind this argument is simple. The goal of
intervention must always be greater than just the cessation
of the shooting or the mere prevention of future fighting.
The alternative, reestablishment of the previous conditions
or maintenance of current conditions, implies that the
intervention will never end. It was the previous conditions
that led to fighting, or it is the current level of tensions that
might lead to fighting. The goal, then, must be something
2

such as the movement of the society beyond the current
antagonisms. That movement comes with progress—when
the people exert control over their lives, rebuild their homes,
enterprises, and places of worship.
The initial military task after the end of hostilities is
disarmament of the combatants. Closely upon this task
follows the hardest task the intervening forces must
accomplish. That is convincing the “winning” combatants
that they should not assume power in “their” territory or
country. Control must stay with the intervenors. They must
break up the monopoly that “won” the war; they must move
the country toward progress.
Progress exists where development or nation-building is
on-going. We can think about development as being driven
either from the top-down (the Soviet monopolistic model) or
from the bottom-up (the American market model). The
former should remain discredited for a long time into the
future. That is not to say that the model no longer is in use,
however—it is employed all over the world. A country bound
by a monopoly such as tradition, all-consuming (therefore
monopolistic) hatreds or dictatorial government will
develop slowly, if at all. All new knowledge must be fed into
and through the monopoly before being applied to create
something different. The latter model has produced the
United States—the most stable, yet ever changing, country
in the world. The reason is simply that many individuals,
not a single organization or system of beliefs, can create and
act on new knowledge. This type of development should be
fostered whenever forces intervene in these modern types of
conflicts. It is essential in a post-hostility environment.
By its very nature, bottom-up development resists
control from above—that is its beauty when applied in an
environment where monopolies are dominant. The
development that occurs chips away at the salience of the
monopoly. Thus, in a place like Kosovo where religion-based
hatred is still monopolistic, forcing residents to focus on
rebuilding their local lives—from local government to
3

businesses—will distract them to a degree from the past
conflict. Once local life becomes reestablished, residents will
see that some towns or areas are doing a better job of that
than are others. This can and should foster competitive
initiatives. Those individuals who succeed here will gain
reputations that they can then use to rise in politics. The
critical element in their rise is that their reputations and
accomplishments will have been based on pragmatic and
NOT ideological success. They are candidates to become the
future leaders of their country.
Beginning the process of bottom-up nation-building is a
military task. The remaining leadership will reject this
approach and may even return to violence to maintain its
prerogatives. Fighters will not want to return to civilian life,
yet their skills and presence will be needed for the
reconstruction of the society. Furthermore, they will have to
be paid if they stay in uniform. The people, in general, may
be leery of adopting the bottom-up approach to development
since most societies around the world have a top-down
orientation. Yet, it is small projects that aggregate into
sustainable development—reconstruction of housing, local
roads, building of a new power grid based on small
generating plants, micro and small loans to reestablish
businesses, and similarly scaled projects. Large-scale
projects must be managed at the national level, difficult to
achieve until stable government exists. Bottom-up designed
projects build local knowledge, forestall a monopolyoriented national government, and break up development
projects into more controllable packages.
Figure 1 schematically lays out the transition from
military to civilian (e.g., U.N.) command and then national
resumption of government. The military is the only
organization capable of initiating such development in a
post-conflict environment. Civilian authority must
negotiate disarmament while the military can demand it.
Similarly, the military can demand that combatants go
home and rebuild local life. The military can command and
transport the goods and services needed to put the
4

combatants out of uniform and back to work. Preliminary
order must be established before a civilian police force can
function effectively. The intervening military must
accomplish these objectives before transitioning control to a
civilian force. They will then have the task of helping
thepeople create a national government.

External
Military Control

Regional Elections

National Election
National
External Civilian
Control

Local Elections

Control

Figure 1. Schematic of transition from intervening (external)
military control to national control after the cessation of
hostilities.
Unity of command is maintained; the transfer is from external
military to external civilian to national control. The election cycle is
superimposed to show that development and the transfer of power
should proceed from the bottom-up. There should be no role for the
intervening powers after a national government has been selected.

Preventing Hostilities.
The tasks of a foreign military force sent in to prevent
the onset or the spread of hostilities (e.g., Macedonia or
Montenegro) are less active than in the post-hostilities
context. Their largest function is as guarantors of the peace.
They are there as part of a diplomatic national assistance
package designed to convince and then assist the national
authority to defuse long-standing ethnic, religious, or
nationalistic tensions. Without the larger diplomatic
package, all they can do is delay the onset of conflict. While
there, they must gather and use intelligence and situational
awareness to be able to respond sharply to any military
5

conflict that may arise. More critically, they are there as
symbols to forestall conflict. The appropriate historical
model for this type of operation is the role of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and the federal marshals during
the civil rights tensions in the American South during the
1960s. The intervening force’s active presence enables the
reduction of the cultural, governmental and other
tendencies that brought on the tensions.
Diplomatic initiatives should convince the national
government to integrate itself and to more closely equalize
the opportunities among the cultures and groups that make
up the country. If this is accomplished, then the intervening
military force becomes a temporary adjunct of the local
central government as they reform past practices that
created the heightened state of tensions in the country. If
this relationship does not develop, then the initial
diplomatic package was either designed for failure or was
not well implemented.
The following three chapters provide a rationale for the
recommendations made above. They constitute a
theoretical foundation for future nation-building
initiatives. Freedom, progress, and stability are the central
concepts of the theory that rest on a base of knowledge. The
distribution of knowledge on governance in a country
determines the availability of freedom and progress and
gives it the degree of stability it possesses. The remainder of
the monograph then takes these concepts and applies them
to situations of military operations other than war.
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CHAPTER 2
CONTEXT OF PEACE

Somalia. Haiti. Bosnia. Kosovo. The limited objectives of
these campaigns differentiate these actions from most
previous American military efforts. While not resembling
the wars of the past, they are likely the precursors of
military campaigns of the future: humanitarian campaigns.
Intra-state, rather than inter-state, issues governed these
campaigns. The cessation of hostilities in operations other
than war, as in war, is just the beginning of foreign (U.S.,
NATO, U.N., others) involvement. What should be the
objective of this military involvement? What is the measure
of the end-state that permits military disengagement with
confidence that a repeat of the military/humanitarian
campaign will not be necessary? This monograph proposes a
speculative, yet logical approach to resolving these
questions. 1 The answers to these questions have
implications for all of Europe, not just the Balkans.
In the above examples, and likely in future instances,
the objectives for military intervention beyond the cessation
of hostilities will be stability and progress. A return to the
status quo that brought on the fighting obviously would be
an insufficient outcome for peace. A truce, whether of the
Korean variety or other form that does not resolve the
war-causing issues, is also not a long-term solution.
Peace will have arrived when the shoemaker sells his
blood-enemy a pair of shoes rather than kill him. That is a
tall order. The history of the Balkans also suggests that this
may be the only realistic definition of peace. Earlier
attempts to contain the hatreds in this region have been
failures. Since the time of the Ottoman Empire, the best
outcomes for the people there have been a series of truces.
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Such truces came with the Ottoman Empire, then the
Habsburg Empire, and finally with Tito after World War II.
The notion of peace as neighbor selling neighbor a pair of
shoes is evocative, but it is also rich in content. First, it does
not say that buyer and seller become friends, or that they
tolerate each other. It does say that they have reached a
state where antagonism and self-interest have come into a
rough balance. Thus in Kosovo, a major event will have
transpired when Serb sells Kosovar a pair of shoes or
Kosovar sells Serb a shirt. Each will have moved beyond
that point where hatred for the other was a monopoly.
Monopolistic conflicts consume the Balkans and other
areas in the world: Serb and Kosovar, Hutus and Tutsis,
Northern Irish Catholic and Protestant, Arab and Jew in
the Middle East, and so on. Present in each of these areas is
a conflict of such intensity that selling shoes to each other is
almost inconceivable. As discussed in the coming pages, the
task is to diminish the saliency of the conflagration-sized
conflicts by introducing many other more brushfire-sized
conflicts. These are conflicts of learning about a larger world
in the individual and competition among enterprises, where
enterprises are churches, civic and other groups, not just
business enterprises. The presence of a multitude of these
smaller conflicts is the best indicator that a society is at
peace internally.
The foreign military—American or those of other
intervening states—has a definite role in achieving peace in
the Balkans and in the other likely operations other than
war over the next decades. A single intervention model,
however, will not serve all of these campaigns. As covered
below, the foreign military role may be a delicate
quasi-diplomatic guarantor role, a short-term balanced
police and logistician facilitating role or a long-term
logistician-as-carrot and police-as-stick pro-consul role.
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Scope and Conclusions.
To remove the fog of peace, we must expand the scope of
the discussion on peace. Peace is not the absence of conflict;
only the dead are not in conflict.
Having neighbor sell neighbor a pair of shoes implies a
certain level of stability. Secondly, movement beyond the
status quo ante or the post-hostilities truce requires a
measure of progress. The social, spiritual, and economic life
of the society must not only resume but also advance. Only
then does peace become a viable descriptor of the environment. These three terms—stability, progress and peace—
are highly interrelated, and are all based on the concept of
freedom. Without freedom, enduring peace, stability, and
progress are impossible. An outline of the monograph’s
themes follows in the next several paragraphs.
The first task is to provide a new definition for freedom.
The existing definitions are misleading. Isaiah Berlin, 2
probably the most highly regarded 20th century thinker on
the idea of freedom, says that we have come up with over 200
definitions of the term since the times of the Greeks and
Romans. He suggests that there are two threads that
permeate all of these definitions. The first of these is the
notion of a constraint on government. The constraint gives
us scope for activities free of external meddling. A good
example of this is the American Constitution’s use of the
phrase: “The Congress shall make no law . . .” Here is an
area where Congress should not enter. Colloquially, this is
the freedom of “keeping government off my back.” The
problem with this definition comes out of the definition of
the state: the monopoly on power. If the state has a
monopoly on power, who is to keep it off the backs of the
people, especially the less favored? The state having to
restrain itself is a fatal problem for this definition. How can
a definition requiring a restraint on government rely on the
power of government to achieve its ends?
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The second thread he identifies as freedom is that we
should be able to make as much of ourselves as we can: “Be
all you can be.” The problem with this definition is that
humans are social beings who have to live with one another.
Thus, we are likely to step on each other when we try to
self-actualize. To misquote Shakespeare: “The problem lies
not in the stars, but in the reality that you, the reader, and I,
the writer, cannot both be emperor of the world at the same
time.” Philosophers from Hegel through Friedrich Hayek 3
have compounded the problem by postulating worlds where
everyone could achieve their destinies while marching in
the same direction. Lenin, Hitler, Mao, and Pol Pot have
taken up this idea and forced their people to march in
lock-step. The result, as we all know, has not been freedom.
The dichotomy Berlin raises, however, is a real part of
our lives both domestically and internationally. Does
freedom stem from individuality or conformity? Do we have
more freedom when we can strike out on our own or when we
have our friends defending our rear? My answer to these
dilemmas is to say that we can strike out on our own when
we know what we are doing. In other situations, we need
friends to support us either because the problems to be
solved are better solved by a group or the risks are such that
a person would be a fool to venture out alone. These
dilemmas will resolve themselves when we realize that the
knowledge content of the two situations is very different.
The proposed definition uses knowledge as the
foundation for freedom to get around these long-standing
problems. This definition will become almost self-evident
after an explanation of how freedom comes into being. My
contention is that freedom is a product of knowledge being
used in a permitted activity. Freedom then becomes that arc
of horizon within which we can act.
The next step is to answer the question of what drives an
increase in freedom. Freedom grows out of certain conflicts.
The first of these conflicts is the product of learning by
individuals.4 Hegel’s resolution of the dialectical thesis and
10

antithesis into a synthesis is probably the best known model
of learning through conflict, even if it is not known as such.
The second form of conflict is marketplace competition.
Enterprises seek to minimize the force of competition by
differentiating themselves from each other. Both Hegel’s
synthesis and the differentiating “better idea” are new
knowledge. When that knowledge is applied it becomes the
basis for additional freedom. This discussion will lead to the
un-surprising conclusion that monopolies are the greatest
enemies of freedom. Monopolies can take many forms: from
the individual who has a one-track mind to cultural,
religious, and civic as well as the traditional business
monopoly.
It is a short step from increasing freedom to a definition
of stability. Stability exists when a society exhibits internal
dynamism—when it creates and applies new knowledge.
Essentially, a stable society uses knowledge to expand its
bounds, its freedom. Homeostasis or the unmoving
teeter-totter are not the models of stability. They represent
a “stability” of balance or no movement. These concepts,
applied to individuals or societies, would represent stasis,
where knowledge is not being produced and freedom is not
being expanded. The imbalance of stability comes from the
many conflicts and competitive situations being resolved
and replaced by further conflicts. A static society regresses
as knowledge is lost—forgotten—and not replaced by new
knowledge.
In short, a stable society participates in progress. 5 The
many conflicts that create stability also foster progress.
Progress is the concrete side of freedom. It is the tangible
product of those activities that result in freedom. New
knowledge applied in an activity produces both freedom and
progress.
The following step describes the different forms of
stability a state may assume. It uses a geological metaphor
to describe how these different types of states come to an
end.
11

Countries such as the Soviet Union, North Korea and
Castro’s Cuba fall into the category of states where
governance is a unitary monopoly. These are the states that
often aspire to be utopias; ones that reject any external
input to the governance process. Dictatorships want to limit
knowledge of governance to the ruling elite. Left alone, such
countries die by dissipation—much as a mountain of shale
can turn into a pile of scree, small uncoordinated pieces.
The next group of states have multiple monopolies in
governance, each governing a separate piece of turf. This
group includes Tito’s Yugoslavia, and then Bosnia and
Macedonia. Also included here is Cuba after Castro if the
refugees go back. Major constituencies maintain areas they
control independently of the central government. The
France of Louis XVI is the exemplar of a multi-monopoly
state. The nobility, the Church, the bourgeoisie, and the
farmers co-existed, with each group having significant
control over its own activities. Like revolutionary France
and Tito’s Yugoslavia, these countries tend to suffer a
violent earthquake when the bonds that keep the
monopolies operating in parallel weaken and then
disappear on the guillotine or in ethnic cleansing. The
remaining groups attempt to impose their methods on the
rest of the population after the center collapses.
The last group of states include just the United States
and the England that has evolved over the past 50 years. 6
These states have an adaptive kind of stability derived from
an absence of monopolies in governance. Here it is as if the
tectonic plates are in constant motion. The earth trembles
constantly at a low level from the many small conflicts that
permeate these societies. The constant competition among
the entities slowly shifts the society without ever leading to
a magnitude 8.0 earthquake. Religious denominations and
even congregations compete with each other for members
and with businesses when they need financing for new
construction. Were the United States and England perfect
examples of this kind—that is, without any monopolies and
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near-monopolies—then everyone would be in constant
competition with everyone else.
Peace is a concept that makes sense only against the
backdrop of the typology of states developed here. The only
enduring internal peace is the peace found in a monopolyfree environment. The peace and stability found in
monopoly or multi-monopoly states is more akin to an
imposed truce than enduring peace. The apparent peace in
these states will either dissipate when government loses its
legitimacy or suffer an earthquake of revolution when the
center weakens.
The components of peace are freedom, stability and
progress. Peace is not the absence of conflict, rather the
dynamic state where many conflicts are ongoing—where
learning and differentiation permit the setting aside of
cataclysmic war for the day-to-day competition of making a
better world; or at least, a better village.
This abstract conception of peace will form the
foundation for a discussion of various countries. Thus, the
first task in a Bosnia or Kosovo is to replace the overriding
large, cataclysmic conflict of ethnic hatred with smaller
business, religious and other non-fatal conflicts that lead to
freedom, stability and progress. This is done at the local
level, almost individual by individual. Preventing ethnic
war in Macedonia or in other states where the killing has
not yet started, on the other hand, poses a very different
problem. Here the national government must take the lead
role, much as the federal government took the lead in
achieving racial integration in America.
The foreign-military role is very different in a state such
as Macedonia not yet infected by ethnic killings than it is in
Kosovo. The foreign troops in Macedonia can provide the
population with a comfort level that permits integration to
start and continue. Intelligence gathering and an occasional
well-timed appearance may be all that is needed here for
success. In Kosovo, the role differs if the goal is a
multi-ethnic or uni-ethnic state. Reestablishment of a
13

multi-ethnic state is a long-term military problem.
Involvement in a multi-ethnic or multi-clan environment
will put more intervening troops at hazard as both the
carrot of logistical support and the stick of military action
will be required.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2
1.Speculative is the right word for this monograph. In its main
thrust, it takes a concept—freedom—from the realm of political science
and reassigns it to the realm of psychology. Freedom has never been a
major research topic in psychology. The author’s advisor in graduate
school wrote a chapter on freedom that was at best mildly received. The
author continues to believe that the chapter was one of the two best
works published by Ivan Steiner. This monograph is the product of 25
years’ ruminations on the topic of freedom, always centered on Steiner’s
chapter. See Ivan D. Steiner, “Perceived Freedom” in Leonard
Berkowitz, Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 5, New
York: Academic, 1972. The publication in 1998 of On Democracy, New
Haven: Yale, by Robert A. Dahl, however, did much to reinforce the
confidence of the author on the utility of this exercise. Dahl, who was
required reading when the author was in his first year in college (1962),
leaves the end of this latest work open. He describes democracy as
practiced in various parts of the world but does not ever give democracy
a concrete definition. Perhaps it has none. Fareed Zakaria, “The Rise of
Illiberal Democracy” in Foreign Affairs, November-December, 1997, by
that journal’s editor, is a good example of an attempt to put democracy
back together again. Dahl’s conclusion, that there are many different
democracies, is the more effective without moving to the psychological
dimension.
2. The literature on freedom is voluminous. Philosopher turned
historian of ideas Isaiah Berlin spent much of his life studying this
literature. His 1958 essay, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” is regarded as a
stunning recapitulation and synthesis of the literature. See the
collection of his essays: The Proper Study of Mankind, New York:
Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1997.
3. Hayek and other recent advocates of capitalism confront the
excesses of capitalism by arguing that it should take place in the context
of a Judeo-Christian setting. See Friedrich Hayek, The Constitution of
Liberty, Chicago: University of Chicago, 1960. Francis Fukuyama is
more explicit in saying that democratic capitalism is the modern
Hegelian utopia. See Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the
Last Man, London: Avon, 1993.
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4. Conflict as the basis of learning is one of several learning theories
extant in psychology. Sigmund Freud, Erik Erickson, and Jean Piaget
use conflict in describing learning. For each of them, learning occurs
when problems are resolved, not avoided. Others include different
schools of behaviorism, observational learning and cognitive processing
models. There is no research breaking down human learning into these
categories. Evidence does suggest that the nonconflict models tend to
account for the simpler kinds of learning situations only. As a result, a
reasonable hypothesis is that the conflict models may account for the
more complex types of learning governing higher order human
processing. Hegel’s dialectic falls within the conflict model of learning
even though he or others have not explicitly termed the dialectic a
learning paradigm. While he spoke of societies being subject to the
dialectic, Piaget’s model of individual learning uses a logic very similar
to the dialectic. Certainly, Hegel does not allow societies to avoid the
dialectic (a la Pavlov’s dogs avoiding shocks); antithesis must confront
thesis in the process of arriving at synthesis.
5. There is much discussion on whether societies are progressing on
the basis of indigenous or borrowed knowledge. Japan and the Soviet
Union have often been accused of living on borrowed knowledge. A
country such as the United States with a vibrant research sector and a
tradition of innovation is likely to experience a more consistent pattern
of progress than will societies that “borrow” the basis of their progress.
The source or basis of progress does matter.
6. The event that perhaps best marks the passing of the old order in
England was the immediate post-war election in which the hero of
World War II, Winston Churchill, was thrown out of office for not
supporting medical and other rights for the “lower” classes, the fighters
of World War II.
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CHAPTER 3
FREEDOM, POWER, AND PROGRESS

The relationship among the words in the chapter title is
the subject of this chapter. The soldier fights for freedom.
Command projects power. Everyone aims for progress. In
fact, as we will see below, the three concepts are very
similar. Both freedom and power are the ability to act.
Progress is the concrete measure of freedom and power.
Freedom—The Basis for Progress and Stability.
I propose a new definition for the concept of freedom. To
begin, however, allow me to sketch out how freedom comes
into being. Knowledge is the father to freedom; not natural
law, the Rights of Man, or other nebulous and misty
forebears. 1 Knowledge becomes freedom through a five-step
process: One, the finding that freedom is a personal
attribute; Two, that freedom is active; Three, that it is
purposive; Four, that it requires success for its nurturance;
and—perhaps most controversially— Five, that permission
is an integral part of freedom. These five elements follow
and build upon their predecessors.
Element #1: Freedom is a personal attribute since all
knowledge is personal.2 The content of any book or computer
hard drive is only information. Only when we assemble
information and put it to some purpose does information
become knowledge. Freedom as a personal attribute
contradicts the widely held position of political scientists
and philosophers that freedom can exist even if individuals
are not in a position to use it. Isaiah Berlin, whose 1958
monograph “Two Concepts of Liberty” 3 is still the
touchstone for most discussions on freedom, accepted the
independent existence of freedom in all of his writings.
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It is meaningless to say that freedom of speech exists if I
am unable to communicate a thought. A freedom of travel is
meaningless to a person without means, ability, or desire to
travel. One may say to the Chinese that freedom of speech
exists in the United States, but a more precise statement
would be that Americans speak out— they act—without fear
of retribution. If all Americans were docile followers, then
they would not speak out and the protections offered by the
Constitution would be irrelevant. All of this leaves aside, of
course, the fact that constitutions with free speech clauses
exist in many countries without protecting a word of speech.
Element #2: Freedom is active, manifesting itself in
activity, not status. A dictionary typically says that having
freedom and being free are equivalent statements. I would
like to insert a difference necessary for an understanding of
freedom. Being free is the status of not being shackled or not
being confined. Having freedom is the ability to act. While
for most purposes, it is necessary to be free before being able
to act, the two are not the same. We are free because of the
actions of others, but no agency can confer freedom on us.
We achieve freedom through the act of learning and the
consequent use of the new knowledge.
Freedom becomes manifest in action. In the simplest of
terms, a person at rest may or may not be able to set a world
record in the 100-meter dash: the proof is in the action.
Element #3: Purpose is an essential building block of
freedom. While I maintain that freedom is active, I do not
say that freedom is random. For the most part, learning
occurs within goal directed activities; in problem-solving
situations. Except in those limited circumstances where
trial-and-error learning is meaningful, the actions that
demonstrate freedom will be purposive. It is purpose that
organizes our activities: Where we want to go determines
what we actually do.
Element #4: Success nurtures the growth of freedom.
Achievement defines freedom. Performance of an act
establishes whether mastery of the act exists. That success
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puts the activity in the actor’s repertoire, allowing it to be
used in the future. An excellent analogy of the need for
success is the freedom created when the family teenager
passes the long awaited driving exam. With that permit
comes the capability, the freedom, to drive—parental
permission and a car having been obtained. Without a
permit, the teen is just a passenger without the freedom to
decide where to go.
Element #5: Permission is an integral part of freedom.4
Libertarians may tell us that autonomy is freedom. What
they ignore is the central social character of humans. 5 For, if
autonomy were freedom, then eventually we will have, a la
Ayn Rand, a single surviving Atlas free to shrug over his
conquered minions. Assuming that such an Ubermensch or
Superman were to come along, he or she necessarily would
use the freedom of autonomy to subjugate the rest of
humanity. Why? Ultimately, only one person can have the
freedom to act autonomously. When more than one person
does it, they are likely to step on one another. Sad as it may
seem, most of us cannot fully self-actualize—become all that
we can be—because of the social costs of so much selfish
activity. Better for us to become what the society gives us
permission to be.
Permission plays two roles relative to activity. The first
and traditionally accepted role of permission is the moral
sanctioning of an activity. Its second role is just as
important, however. Here, it is a mechanism for passing
information from society or parent to the individual or child.
Thus, when a mother says to her son that he may ice skate
on the frozen lake, she is also telling the child that the ice is
safe for skating.
Figure 2 presents the elements of freedom. A quick
perusal shows that this definition of freedom is pragmatic in
nature. While not a part of the central thesis of this
monograph, the definition has the robustness to encompass
religious and ideological freedom as well as the active sense
pursued here. Thus, highly religious, perhaps fundamental,
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persons may take certain action based on their knowledge of
God and the purpose of salvation, thereby deriving a sense
of freedom often felt by the religiously fervent.
Freedom is the product of....
* Knowledge
Truth, facts, shared beliefs
*applied to a purpose
Unorganized knowledge
is merely information
*in a non-disallowed activity
Freedom is active
Freedom is the arc
of the individual’s horizon for action
Figure 2. A definition of freedom.
Another definition is: The more we know, the more we can do. The
more we can do, the greater is our arc of freedom.

Governmental regulatory programs often play the above
“mother” role in telling us that prescription drugs or the
airlines are safe. The Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) inspects aircraft and airline procedures, in part, to
convince us that they are safe, despite the occasional
accident. We have neither the time nor the skill to inspect
the plane, its log books, and the training of the crew as we
race from city to city. The FAA does this for us. Our
acceptance of this information exchange is evident in the
fact that passenger loads hardly decline for an airline even
after the airline may have suffered multiple crashes in a
short period of time. 6
Illegal or licentious behavior is unsanctioned behavior.
As a rule, such behavior does not lead to or produce freedom.
Committing murder (a criminal homicide) does not
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contribute to any person’s freedom—unless the guardians of
the law are absent.
Creative activity is the one, normal exception to the need
for permission as a precursor to activity. No one can tell the
artist what to paint. The best we can do when confronted by
creativity, is to not disallow it from proceeding.
In summary, then, freedom is created when knowledge
is applied to a purpose in a permitted, or not disallowed,
activity that leads to success. Except for some minor
allowances, such as letting us learn from the failure of
others, this is the only way freedom comes into being. 7
Prosaically, freedom is the ability to do what we want to
do. The more we do, the more we learn to do; which in turn,
allows even more action. At each step in the process, we gain
greater freedom. Thus, freedom becomes the individual’s
arc of horizon within which action is possible. Each person’s
horizon may be near or far, and broad or narrow in angle in
the horizontal or vertical dimension. The boundaries of
freedom, excepting the creative act that expands the
bounds, are knowledge and permission—the personal and
the social. The perfect Renaissance person, of course, has a
horizon that is both very broad and deep—therefore having
almost complete freedom.
Some Notes on Power, Having Freedom and Being
Free, and the Role of Institutions.
The contention here is that use of knowledge leads to
freedom. If so, how does this square with Bacon’s famous
dictum that knowledge is power? In practice, power and
freedom are the same thing: the ability to accomplish. They
differ in their contexts. That is, the ability to accomplish is
power when the knowledge used is a monopoly. In contrast,
action taken in freedom has widely held knowledge as its
foundation. Power and freedom represent the end points
along a continuum where knowledge varies with its degree
of dispersion. Power increases in effect as knowledge
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becomes more monopolistic. Conversely, freedom increases
as knowledge becomes more widely dispersed.
If freedom follows from knowledge, then the source of
freedom becomes the educational process. This poses a
problem for a wide range of institutions, from the military to
the American Constitution, that many see as the promoters,
protectors, and guarantors of freedom. Two factors apply
here. First is the distinction made above between “being
free” and “having freedom.”
When Berlin and others in the Anglo-American tradition
speak of freedom as the area wherein the individual is free
to act independently, they are speaking about being free.
Berlin named this concept “negative freedom” because its
causation is a restraint on government. It does not
necessarily follow from his formulation that people can or
will act just because government stays off their backs. For
example, the just-released prisoner will have few resources
that are applicable in a greatly changed world outside of
prison after 50 years of incarceration. He is free, but has
little freedom because his knowledge stock—how to survive
in prison—is not relevant or useful on the outside.
The distinction between being free and having freedom
illuminates the role of the military in the life of the country.
It exists to keep us free, an essential precursor to our having
freedom.
The second factor is the role of institutions in freedom
creation. Institutions from elections to the separation of
powers are human creations, designed to achieve specific
purposes. Thus, the Constitution delineates certain
freedoms and not others. The Constitution protects only a
few narrow slices of freedom—the slices for speech, religion,
etc.—and essentially ignores the other areas or slices where
Americans have the capability to act.
At best, institutions channel and protect certain
freedoms; they create no freedom. The American
Constitution is a governing document—a super law. As
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such, it is not surprising that the Constitution directs the
activities of both governmental entities and the people.
Giving direction may be a freedom protecting act, but
direction or command cannot create freedom. That would
require forcing the horse to drink after leading him to the
trough.
Increasing Freedom and Progress.
How does freedom increase; how is the collective horizon
of a citizenry enlarged? The basis of the enlargement is new
knowledge and the dispersion of existing knowledge. But
what prompts the creation of new knowledge?
Conflict and competition are the engines of both
knowledge creation and freedom. Individuals experience
conflict when problem solving leads to the replacement of
old information with the new. Competition leads
enterprises to differentiate themselves from their
competitors. They must develop the proverbial “better idea”
to serve as the basis of the differentiation. Each bit of
successful problem solving and differentiation increases the
resources available for future action, thereby increasing the
freedom of the actors.
When an actor uses new knowledge to create a new
product, two things happen. First comes the freedom drawn
from success. Second comes the widget from which the actor
profits. This product represents progress. 8 The use of new
knowledge is the best measure of progress. 9
The interesting part of the relationship between freedom
and progress, however, lies in the negative instance: What
happens when knowledge acquisition and progress cease?
By analogy, the equipment begins to rust and eventually
falls apart. Unused knowledge disappears, both at the level
of the individual and the society.
Can a group or society decide to maintain and practice a
certain stock of knowledge and freeze progress at a certain
point? Many such attempts have existed in the United
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States over the years. Small groups have decided to live by
themselves, generally in communes, following a given set of
rules. The problem is that no group can truly isolate itself
from the rest of the society. The little give and take that
remains eventually forces change or dissolution on the
commune. This is not to say that successful communes have
not existed and continue to do so. Two famous communes
are Amana (Iowa) and Oneida (New York). They are no
longer famous for being communes, but rather for the line of
appliances and silverware they developed to bring resources
into their communities.
Examples such as Amana suggest that small groups can
maintain a utopian vision for a time with some
accommodation to the outside world. Certainly one of the
reasons they can be successful is that members can come
and go into the larger society. Attempts to achieve utopian
visions at a societal level have all suffered defeat.
A society-wide vision of utopia becomes hard to
maintain, because history intervenes and passes it by.
Country-wide utopian attempts have also been deadly,
since death or the gulag are the only options for those who
disagree with the ruling vision. The leaders of the revolution
are not going to allow others to tell them that their holy
vision is flawed. Only those dissidents able to escape the
country’s borders have a chance at normality. Thus, the
Soviet workers’ paradise was a well-defined dream at the
time of the Russian Revolution. It became the ideal the
Soviet Union would have to strive to achieve, even at the
cost of many lives. Obviously, they did not make it. In the
end, the leadership’s effort to co-opt history and to control
external developments created so many contradictions that
the system could not stand. Hitler’s and Pol Pot’s utopias
would have suffered similar fates if war had not
intervened. 10
The desire to proclaim an ideal, stop history and
eliminate change will always be with us. Fortunately,
unless someone attempts to create a world-wide utopia,
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history and the march of new knowledge will interfere with
those attempts. Since the creation of new knowledge is not
likely to cease, neither is the growth of freedom. Progress,
the consequence of utilizing that freedom, will follow
naturally as long as we do not hinder it.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3
1. See Fernand Braudel, A History of Civilizations, New York:
Penguin, 1993. Over the course of this volume, Braudel traces the use of
the term liberty from its Latin origins to the modern day. The term is
used early on to generally connote privileges, and it is only after the
French Revolution that it assumes its modern meaning of freedom. See
his discussions on the times after plagues, times when there was more
land than there were peasants to farm it. One consequence of the
plagues is that the peasants of the 11th and 12th centuries had freedom
(or really power) because they represented a scarce resource. The
middle 19th century is the turning point after which freedom becomes a
more concrete concept.
2. I take a pragmatic approach to the concept of knowledge.
Knowledge is that which a group (two or more individuals) agrees to be
true. In other words, knowledge and truth are socially determined. This
is why one baseball team at each level from PeeWee to the Major
Leagues can all be considered World Champions despite the reality that
only one team can be the best. This definition is an expansion of Karl
Popper’s notion of truth as the result of the scientific process. Scientists
accept as true or valid those results of experimentation where attempts
at refutation have been unsuccessful. Given that Popper wrote at a time
of great ideological ferment (1930s to 1950s), it is understandable why
he limited truth to the results of the scientific method. Reality, however,
is much broader. Ideology does drive much behavior. Religious people
accept a given set of truths depending on their denomination, and
within each congregation, accept certain “facts” as truths. Ideological
and religious truths cannot be refuted, yet they “account” for much that
is considered true in our lives. To permit truth to exist in religious, civic,
musical, and other realms, I suggest that the scientific method is a social
convention—which, in fact, it is. It is a social—an agreed upon—
convention because scientists accept as true results which, in the future,
they know will be refuted or supplanted: thus, Socrates’ ether becomes
our atmosphere. In this view, truth becomes the product of any accepted
process that serves the need of a group or community. This is not to say
that truth is relative. It merely reflects the reality that different
communities have their own “truths.” In our modern world, these truths
quickly come into conflict. In simpler times, they co-existed in separated
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realities. See Karl Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, Princeton:
Princeton University, 1972.
3. See Endnote 2, Chapter 2.
4. Morality is usually seen as the external societal counterweight to
selfish autonomy or negative freedom. Here, pre-action moral judgment
and information exchange are a part of the process of building freedom.
5. The writings of Richard A. Epstein are representative of the
libertarian position. For me, his writing has the advantage of sharing an
aversion to monopolies, a topic he gives considerable coverage in
Principles for a Free Society, New York: Perseus Books, 1998.
6. Even a horrific event like the ValuJet crash in the Everglades led
only to the recertification of the airline by the FAA and the subsequent
renaming of the airline to AirTran. AirTran continues flying. A more
established airline, USAir, had multiple crashes in the early 1990s
without major long-term effects on its passenger loads. One would
expect the consequences for these airlines to be much more negative
without the FAA being there to reassure passengers after each accident.
7. In sketching the development of freedom in this monograph, I
stay to the main branch of the process. We do learn from our own
mistakes and those of others and build freedom on that learning. We
also learn by observational learning, a relatively conflict-free process.
But observational learning has never been shown to apply to more
complex learning.
8. Robert Nisbet, History of the Idea of Progress, New York: Basic
Books, 1980. In his foreword, Nisbet says that if the idea of progress dies
in the West, then much else will die with it.
9. This sentence again illustrates my desire to remain on the main
road in describing this freedom-peace model. Obviously, new knowledge
can be used “wastefully” for old purposes. I hope readers do not become
bogged down on such side roads in this short monograph.
10. See Lutz Niethammer, Posthistorie: Has history come to an end?,
P. Camiller, trans., New York: Verso, 1992. This short volume provides
excellent arguments for seeing all utopian dreams as failures in the
making.
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CHAPTER 4
A MODEL OF SOCIETIES

This chapter uses the distribution of knowledge on
governance to define three types of societies that exist along
a continuum. It extends from the society where everyone
knows how to govern the country to the society, a
dictatorship, where one person controls all knowledge of
governance. Later, we will see that the location of a society
along this continuum determines the strategies that will be
successful when diplomatic or military intervention
becomes necessary. The distinctions among countries
discussed here may also become indices for the likelihood
that interventions may be required in the future.
Freedom as the Source of Stability:
The Adaptive Society.
New knowledge, once used to new effect, represents
change and progress. As a result, for freedom to be the
source of societal stability, stability must incorporate
change. A static stability necessarily loses ground to others
who continue changing and developing. More importantly,
static stability loses ground to itself as the store of
knowledge rusts and dissipates. Change, as a part of
stability, makes sense if the change comes in small
increments. Following the geological metaphor, tectonic
plates that slide continuously past each other may cause a
constant rumbling in the earth, but they will not cause great
earthquakes. The contrast between the Soviet Union and
the United States in this regard is illustrative. Lenin and
Stalin tried to minimize change to their plans. Perestroika
proved to Soviet citizens and the entire world that the
“workers’ paradise” had been a false dream, made possible
by the Russian ability to withstand deprivation. The United
States has shifted direction and focus over time as it
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adapted to changes in knowledge, world events and the
myriad changes that have occurred over the last 200 years:
It has remained stable.
The source of American stability is abstracted in Figure
3. It depicts knowledge of governance being widely
dispersed and without fixed boundaries. The absence of
boundaries is important. Many, if not most, Americans
believe they could run government better than the current
incumbents. Unfortunately for each of us with these beliefs,
our beliefs are not held by a large enough group for us to
take over the government. Any change we propose must
first gather a coalition around it before it can be
implemented. By the time we have put together a powerful
enough coalition, our great ideas have been compromised
almost into oblivion.
The reason for American adaptability lies not so much in
its government, but rather the highly competitive nature of
the society. Competitive clashes occur by the second.
Members of industries compete to achieve market share.
Across industries, salespersons, preachers, park
superintendents, and others in the retail trade compete not
only for the consumers’ money, but also for their time. Each
of these competitions, small as they are, push the country in
their own ways. The sum result of all these little pushes is

wide, unmanaged dispersal of knowledge
Figure 3. Dispersion of knowledge of governance in an
adaptive society.
Here many, if not most, individuals influence government as separate
actors and through multiple affiliations.
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movement in very small increments. That movement, the
sum of all new knowledge and purpose put to the
competitive test, represents the most reliable vision of
national stability.
The element that separates the American illustration of
stability from all others is that there is no one vision, force,
or person controlling it. It is a stability sponsored, if it has a
sponsor, by Adam Smith’s “invisible hand,” 1 extended here
not only over the economic marketplace, but also the public
and religious marketplaces. 2
Participation of a sufficiently large part of the
population results in this kind of stability. Participants
need to be both producers and consumers in all
marketplaces. The resulting interaction keeps each
competitive event relatively small. The nature of each
competition cannot be cataclysmic—a company that
depends on making one sale per year is in a cataclysmic
competition. It is do or die. The cost of failure must not be so
great that the associated people become pariahs for life.
Second acts and even multiple acts must be possible to
ensure early failure recognition. This opens enterprise to
“creative destruction.” The inclusion of minorities and
women along with white males in economic, social, civic,
and religious discourse can only increase the stability of the
United States. This inclusiveness upsets traditional
patterns of doing business. Tradition is a behavioral
monopoly. Countries with more monopolistic tendencies,
the highly traditional, have no mechanism for achieving
change so effectively or with so much stability.
The above discussion fairly represents the third type of
stability mentioned in the Introduction. The United States
and then England are probably the best examples of
countries exhibiting adaptive stability. Adaptively stable
states have few to no monopolies influencing the
governance of the country.
Since World War I, and especially after World War II,
England has greatly increased its degree of inclusiveness.
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More recently, England has limited the role of government
in the economy. Furthermore, it has begun the process of
devolving powers to Scotland, Wales, and soon to Northern
Ireland. Each of these events represents an instance where
the number of players, and therefore competition, is being
increased.
Much is happening in England that makes it more
democratic: however, its basic form of government is not
democratic. England is an elected dictatorship. To begin
with, national elections typically revolve around each
party’s nominee for prime minister. Yes, parliament is
elected. Given the strength of party loyalty, however, its role
is secondary to that of the prime minister. As Margaret
Thatcher demonstrated, a prime minister can foster great
changes independently of the parliament. Practically
speaking, the Parliament is the only government in
England, and the Prime Minister has absolute power while
in office. That England continues to become more inclusive
speaks to the possibility of having competing voices heard
even in a semi-dictatorship.
The mark of countries with adaptive stability is the
multiplicity of active participants in the society’s
governance. Few of them will be in government. They must
have influence, in their small way, in directing the path of
the country. 3 In practical terms, a society becomes more
stable and more adaptable as the number of people making
decisions increases. Church attendance, purchase of
products, support of charities, and membership in civic,
voluntary, and even sports clubs—each in its own
way—contributes to the governance of the country. To see
the sprouting of soccer fields across the United States over
the last 20 years is to see the effect on government of
increasing membership in a particular kind of sport club.
What may break up the adaptive stability of a state such
as the United States? I will return to this question later.
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Monopoly Societies.
The opposite of adaptive stability is what I have termed
monopoly stability. This is the case where governance is a
single monopoly, and the owners of the monopoly reject
external input. The scope for decisionmaking is very
narrow, the country having a few leaders and many
followers. The Soviet Union is the historic example of a
monopoly society. It had an imposed stability since few were
able to influence the direction of governance.
Cuba and China are also good examples of monopoly
societies. The leaders of both countries have permitted
change to occur when forced by circumstances to do it. Thus,
both countries allow capitalists to provide those goods the
socialist economy no longer can provide. The changes that
have occurred have been in the economic realm. The realm
of government remains as a strict monopoly. What happens
when the two countries’ leadership ages further and then
fades away? The one thing the Soviet Union, Cuba and
China have shared is elimination of all possible competing
visions of governance. How many leaders do these countries
have who could lead the country without the use of the gun?
Current events in Russia suggest the answer may be very
few. Thus, the initial expectation of the end game in these
countries is a dissipation of power with a considerable
interregnum until a new entity assumes power.
Figure 4 may be contrasted with Figure 3 to show a very
different pattern for the dispersion of knowledge of
governance between adaptive and monopoly societies. In a
monopoly society, the leadership or dictator closely holds all
such knowledge, eliminating any person or group that
might want to share or take some of the leadership’s power.
Consequently, when the central power weakens or
disappears due to death or other causes, power coalitions
must first be created before a new central power emerges.
This takes time, opening the society to a period of chaos.
That chaos may lead to the need for external intervention
when nonconclusive fighting breaks out.
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highly centralized knowledge
Figure 4. A rendition of concentrated knowledge of
governance found in monopoly societies.
Little knowledge of governance remains when the center weakens or
disappears. Chaos or fragmentation are likely results.

China may be an exception to this rule in that in opening
its economy, it has let in foreign investors and expertise.
These investors, companies, and foreign staffs represent a
major infusion of knowledge to the country. This knowledge
affects the local level where the factories and offices with
foreigners interact with the Chinese. Given the great size of
China, the sophistication being gained at the city level does
not necessarily diffuse outward or even upward. The need to
adapt to economic freedoms and foreign influence, however,
opens up the possibility that political power may shift from
the center in Beijing to the affected cities. It is not
unreasonable to see the growth of at least four major power
centers in China: Beijing, Taipei, Shanghai, and Hong
Kong. A further possibility, of course, would be the
development of a fifth power center in the western,
less-Han, part of China. Such a transformation obviously is
not a foregone conclusion, but the current flows of
knowledge in China suggest that this is an outcome with
real potential.
Given the current circumstances in Cuba, the expected
outcome of the death of the current leadership should be
dissipation, much as is happening in the former Soviet
Union. The presence of so many refugees just 90 miles away
in Miami, however, changes the scenario somewhat. If the
refugees do not return to Cuba and bring their American
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experience with them, then dissipation is the immediate
consequence of the center’s losing control.
If the refugees do return instantly, and do so in great
numbers, then major conflict could arise. There will be
strong competition to see which group can take over the
national government. Civil war is not an unreasonable
expectation if the number of returnees and their competing
visions for the Cuban future are both high.
Multi-Monopoly Societies.
The intermediate case between adaptive and monopoly
societies is the multi-monopoly society. Here the central
authority does not attempt to maintain a comprehensive
monopoly. It allows the major sectors of the society
essentially to rule themselves, so that each has its own
monopoly. Louis XVI allowed the Church, the bourgeoisie,
and the landed farmers to manage their own affairs as long
as these did not interfere with the prerogatives of the king.
Similarly, in Macedonia the dominant ethnic groups have
lives that do not intersect very much. Each of these groups
maintains its own schools, villages, and even government.
This reflects the typical pattern of governance that has
existed in the Balkans, at least since the Ottoman Empire.
Figure 5 dwells on the characteristic of countries with
multi-monopoly stability whereby parallel and separate
means of governance co-exist. Such societies exist in a
middle ground between adaptive and monopoly societies.
Groups know how to manage the state, or believe they do,
from their experience in managing their own affairs.
Contending powers are ready to try to fill the vacuum when
the center weakens and fails. This is not to say that the
collapse of the center is an instant event; it takes time.
When it happens, however, the consequences are very dire,
with much loss of life: revolution in France and ethnic
cleansing in post-Tito Yugoslavia.
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well defined, segmented
perspectives

Figure 5. Knowledge of governance distributed in a segmented
fashion.
The Church, nobles, bourgeoisie, and landed farmers in Revolutionary
France each knew how government should operate. They fought for
the heart of France when Royal power failed.

Reality is that states fall along a continuum rather than
just in the three categories discussed above. What
differentiates states along this continuum is the number of
separate monopolies with internal governance responsibilities.
It is possible to envision the adaptively stable regime’s
demise taking either a monopolistic or multi-monopolistic
form. First of all, the demise of such a state will occur much
less frequently than is the case with the other forms of
states. The reason is that the center, or national
government, is relatively a much weaker institution here
than it is in the other two cases. Thus, transitions in
government are less momentous for the country than when
one dictator replaces another one. The transition fight—by
election or other means—may be expensive. It is not likely,
however, to produce the many deaths of a putsch, civil war,
or revolution. Furthermore, as the number of constituencies
in a state increases, the power of each group necessarily
falls. This makes it less likely that any one group can grab
power; there are just too many contenders. The contenders
in a monopolistic or multi-monopolistic state are fewer, but
they start the battle being closer to the goal—they have
always been close to the center of government.
Given that, how may an adaptive state die? It could allow
a monopoly to arise and thereby become rejective. This
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seems far fetched in the United States, but not impossible. If
one does not look too closely at the calls for the United States
to become a “Christian nation,” one could make the case for
a monopolistic fundamentalist government arising here.
After all, 30-40 percent of the population claims to be
fundamentalist. That should be a strong base. National
elections, however, have shown that this is not a monolithic
block. Should the possibility actually arise that the
fundamentalists might assume power, very rapidly one
would see the monolithic block reduced to contending sets of
beliefs. This is reasonable since there are many
denominations or wings of denominations that consider
themselves to be fundamentalist and yet have enough
differences among themselves to not coalesce into one
denomination. 4
Alternatively, another possibility would be the
intensification of “identity” politics in the country. Over
time this might lead to the formation of communities with
their own rulemaking authority. Again, this possibility does
not have a high probability, but it suggests a way that the
country could move toward the multi-monopoly model.
India may be the ultimate expression of identity politics.
India may even obtain some stability from the combination
of its government having a short and weak reach into the
groups and the large number of linguistic, religious, and
caste divisions in the country. These groups interact with
each other only minimally.
Differentiation of states into this multi-monopoly,
monopoly, and adaptive typology differs from other means
of categorizing states. Whether a government is elected, has
various institutions, or passes other procedural tests, does
not matter. The relevant dimension is how knowledge is
used in governance. Is the knowledge of governance held
exclusively? Is it shared among defined groups that manage
their own affairs (a part of the state)? Or, is it dispersed
throughout the population so that many forces, most
outside government, direct governance? One way that this
methodology is valuable is that it permits putting England
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strongly in the freedom camp without having to use
uncomfortable words to get around its semi-dictatorial
structure. At the other extreme, it is clear the governments
of some of the former Soviet states are maintaining their
dictatorial ways despite the adoption of elections and other
democratic fixtures. Once fully operationalized, this
knowledge-based means of analyzing governance should be
the basis of more reliable indices of where, and what type of,
problems may arise around the world.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4
1. Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth
of Nations, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976. This oft-quoted
work deserves a close reading. The society he describes as being under
the control of the invisible hand is that of the small shopkeeper in 18th
century England. He does not rule out the use of government controls
where necessary.
2. The idea of multiple marketplaces is drawn from Richard J.
Neuhaus, The Naked Public Square, Chicago: Eerdmans, 1984. Rev.
Neuhaus argues that religion has been improperly removed from the
public (i.e., civic) square. Another interpretation is that religion has
always been there, but given the highly competitive nature of religion in
the United States, the effect is that no single voice can predominate.
Thus, although many denominations argue for prayer in the schools, a
similar number argue for church-state separation on this issue.
3. A very current example of how companies affect national
governance is the case of HMOs and the health insurance business, in
general. Through their decisions to pay for certain procedures and not
others, these companies are taking on police powers, powers generally
left to the states. Conceptually, there is not much difference between a
state saying “We will incarcerate you if you do that,” and an insurance
company saying “We will not pay if you have that procedure.”
4. The issue of the effect fundamental religions have on states needs
further study. The utopian character of fundamental Christianity is
well-accepted. In the utopian manner, fundamentalists believe in a
sequenced history, with the “troubles” yet to come; they see themselves
as the chosen to go to Heaven; and they describe the rest of the
population as unworthy of going to Heaven. See Karen Armstrong, A
History of God, New York: Knopf, 1993.
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CHAPTER 5
THE SEARCH FOR PEACE

Most wars have a common psychological characteristic.
The participants have a high degree of certainty about their
mission. That certainty translates into the absence of
existential conflict within the participants. So, war is a
condition where there is a high level of external
(inter-group) conflict and a low level of intra-individual
conflict. Serb and Kosovar—man, woman, and child—had
clear visions and missions they supported fervently. The
war then proceeded from bases that constituted
impenetrable monopolies. The end of active hostilities
brought an end to the external conflict. What remains is the
internal certainty that combatants took to war. The
dissipation of that certainty—perhaps among all
combatants—is a necessary part of moving from the
cessation of hostilities to the beginning of peace.
As said earlier, peace is not established after hostilities
until the combatants would rather sell each other shoes
than kill each other. This has not happened in the Balkans
since the rise of the Ottoman Empire. In other words, it may
be appropriate to speak of a continuous state of war existing
in the Balkans for hundreds of years, broken up only by a
few externally imposed truces. The resolution of this type of
conflict does not come quickly, and the current danger is the
establishment of just another externally imposed truce.
That truce can end suddenly after the removal of external
military forces.
The key to a lasting peace in the Balkans is the
imposition of new, less lethal conflicts in the minds of the
contending populations. These are the conflicts of learning
and competition.
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The real end-state of hostilities exists in situations
where interests become so heterogeneous that no
perspective can put together enough members to force the
rest to do something. Peace rests on a pattern of
wide-ranging interactions.
An example taken from the American context
demonstrates the effect multiple and contradictory beliefs
can have on behavior. Many special-identity Yellow Pages
directories have come on the market over the past few years.
Proponents have published Christian, Black, Hispanic, and
probably other Yellow Pages. Anecdotally, these seem to
have disappeared. The suggested reason for their demise
might be the conflict they pose for merchants and business
people: “Am I a seller of shoes or an ethnic/gender-based
seller of shoes?” Both are legitimate business models, but
the first offers the greater promise of success. While they
may have wanted to contribute to the growth of businesses
run by people like themselves, the urge to claim the entire
marketplace won when these directories lost support.
American history governs this logic. Wheat-growing
state governments have always been much more interested
in having their farmers sell grain to communist
governments than has the national government. The state’s
well-being depends on the farmer getting a good price for the
wheat. As a result, grain belt politicians have usually been
the last persons arguing for embargoes or other policies
limiting grain sales.
Military operations other than war involve unique
strategies based on local circumstances. Bosnia and Kosovo,
where the killing has been intense, require ethnic
separation before any other intervention can become
meaningful. In this type of situation, the presence of the
intervening force says to the residents that they should
build new lives while the force keeps their enemies at bay.
The challenge in nation-building under these conditions is
to create a stable, progressive state with a foundation of
knowledge-based freedom that becomes integrated with its
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neighbors—eventually even with its enemies. The task is to
create and foster the growth of competition in endeavors
that were never competitive in the past. A more
accomplishment-oriented ethos should replace nationalistic
fervor. These strategies fit most easily in the economic and
civic marketplaces.
An example from the civic marketplace illustrating this
phenomenon would be an attempt to reduce nationalism in
Kosovo. Nationalism and other ideologies survive best when
taken on a grand scale, without the need to balance them
with reality. This example attempts to insert that reality
check. Kosovo, as this is being written right after the end of
the bombing, is a clean slate—little remains of the past
government and institutions. One possible U.N. strategy
might be to create local-level governments with defined
responsibilities and appropriate resources (taxing
authority). Local government, given a chance to develop
before a “national” government develops, should be an
effective counter-weight to the nationalism that might
dominate the national government.
Local politics is the politics of fixing potholes. It is easy
for constituents to determine if the job is being done. Thus,
not only is local government a counter-weight to national
government through the division of responsibilities, it also
becomes an excellent pragmatic training ground for
national service. The building of local governments in this
type of situation illustrates the bottom-up approach needed
to move beyond the permanent truce this area has suffered
for decades.
An example from the economic marketplace might come
out of the re-establishment of power plants in the state.
Competition would be served if one or a few large power
plants were replaced with many smaller ones forming at
least several power companies. Just the increase in the
number of power companies or authorities spread out
around the country would make power less of a national and
more of a local issue. Each region, area, or neighborhood
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could assume “ownership” of its plant. The losses in scale of
efficiency would be made up, technically, by the greater
redundancy among the plants and, politically, by the
lowered likelihood that the national government would
usurp the power grid. Its many “owners” are more likely to
defend such a grid than the impersonal grid that brings
power from far away.
Macedonia, on the other hand, still offers the possibility
of achieving a reduction in tensions through internal
integration. In this case, action must flow from the top
down. In a sense, the strategy for keeping a Macedonia
together is almost the opposite of that for a Kosovo. Here the
task is to foster interaction among the groups, to change
perceptions, and to meld a stronger whole from the
previously isolated pieces. The appropriate strategies will
flow downward from the central government as it creates
opportunities for interaction among the ethnic groups.
American experience in racial integration is relevant
here. The Federal Government led the effort to achieve
integration—of course, under pressure if not duress. It was
federal laws and police power that opened doors for
minorities and women. So it must be in Macedonia where
the government itself must become multi-ethnic to set the
example for the ethnic communities.
The Need for a New Concept to Define Peace.
If freedom involves conflict, then peace must as well. It
seems to be an inescapable consequence. It is also a
contentious statement. Many Europeans, for example,
argue that the competitive spirit that permeates this
country is unnecessary and undesirable: Why have 35
brands of tooth paste when a person uses only one? The
same complaint is raised about the messiness and expense
of American politics. Referring back to the earlier discussion
about utopias, the response to such criticism is to ask: Who
should make the decision as to which brands to allow into
the market and how a candidate should run the campaign?
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When a person or institution makes these decisions, as
opposed to a marketplace, rigidities insinuate themselves
into the fabric of the society. The more that happens, the
less the country is adaptable to future change.
Another charge that may be made against the
monograph’s arguments is that they are a restatement of
pluralism. The concept of pluralism has two meanings. 1 The
first of these is the idea that a diversity of groups is a good
thing for societies. The diversity of a country such as
Switzerland with its independent language-specific
Cantons falls into this type of pluralism. However, the
purpose here is the opposite of interaction. The Cantons
maintain their independence as a means of preserving
cultural heritage.
The second meaning of pluralism comes from the
doctrine that the common good includes both majority and
minority positions. This is where the idea of tolerance enters
pluralism. It may be a cynical thing to say, but the most
appropriate suggestion here is that few majorities exhibit
more tolerance than they absolutely must demonstrate.
One might ask the members of the American Republican
and Democratic parties how tolerant of each other they are.
Their answers probably would not be on the pleasant side of
tolerant. How tolerant of each other are American members
of different denominations? An indicator might be that
many denominations believe that only their members will
go to Heaven. Pluralism in all its guises is a straightforward proposition. It speaks to a multiplicity of
perspectives, not their interaction and the consequences of
the interaction. Conflict is not an essential ingredient in
pluralism. 2
The internal conflict proposed here is real; it leads to a
balancing of costs and benefits, and in general, slows down
decisionmaking. A considered, balanced decision is more
likely to be a moderate decision than its counterpart. If all
people experienced such decisionmaking, then war would
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certainly become a less likely means of settling national or
ethnic differences.
Unfortunately, not a few people want to complicate their
lives to the degree necessary to internalize this argument.
Certainly, the United States survives with many adherents
to single issues, from advocates of a machine gun in every
closet to the protectors of the snail darter. The element that
keeps these forces in check is their multiplicity. For every
advocate of a position, there is another person or group
advocating its opposite. This leads to competition of a rather
high order. Groups are able to win battles but not wars; in
fact, their wars never end. The overall environment that
exists in these wars is that none of the combatants can put
the final nail in the coffin of their opponents and therefore,
rarely try. At the same time, they do not become drinking
friends or necessarily tolerate each other. That is as it
should be if stability and progress are the goal.
A Descriptor for Freedom-Fostering Societies:
Plurascity.
We need a descriptor for the multiplicity of conflicts that
exist in a peaceful, stable and progressive state. Pluralism
is not it. I have coined a term to describe such a society; the
best example of which is the United States. The United
States is a plurascity,3 not a perfect one but with more
plurascitic characteristics than other countries. The word
comes from the Latin, and means multiple knowledges. For
conflict to be as widespread as it is here, knowledge must be
widely distributed as well—the level of freedom must be
high. Americans act on the knowledge they have; building
businesses, associations, and for/against government
designs. All of that activity, in widespread competition,
keeps the tectonic plates of politics from becoming over
stressed.
Because the level of freedom is high in the United States,
the effectiveness of power must be correspondingly low.
Every political action requires the creation of
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coalitions—temporary monopolies—before an issue can be
resolved. That is why issues are rarely resolved in this
country—no one has the power to win the final battle of any
argument.
Figure 6 shows the differences between pluralism and
plurascity. We can think of India as an almost perfect
example of pluralism. India is divided into hundreds of
groups along the schisms of religion, caste, language, and
economics. These groups are essentially self-governing and
supporting. They co-exist. What conflict exists among them
is likely to take the form of riots or temple burnings.
Plurascitic conflict—Brahmin competing with
untouchable—is absent. India will become a plurascity only
when the boundaries between groups become more pervious
to competition among individuals, enterprises and
associations.
Pluralism

Plurascity

Doctrine that a diversity of
groups is a good thing.

Condition where life’s
conflicts are internalized
in the individual to
moderate the intensity
of group and sociatal
conflicts.

Implementation:
Federalism -- Adaptation to
a given multiplicity for the
sake of peace.
Functional autonomy -Adaptation to maintain
group distinctions.
Doctrine that the common good
includes both majority and
minority positions.

Figure 6. The contrast between pluralism and plurascity.
Plurascity required the conflict of competition, not just the
cohabitation found in pluralism.

It should be noted, however, that India does owe much of
its stability to the existence of so many distinct groupings
within its borders. At the same time, the presence of these
independent groups guarantee that the central government
of India will remain weak internally until the distinctions
among the groups become blurred. It is hard to envision that
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blurring coming about without the dissolution of the Indian
state into smaller, more manageable units.
In summary, peace is rich in the brushfire-sized conflicts
that never reach the status of conflagrations. It is not the
absence of conflict. Plurascitic conflict exists within
individuals—as when religious and economic arguments
contend for supremacy in a salesperson. The conflict also
exists among individuals and groups in the form of
competition. In the latter form, the conflict will extend
across multiple marketplaces. The combination of internal
conflict and enterprise competition ensures that the major
motivators of war—nationalism, sectarianism,
acquisitiveness—are moderated by other forces.
Plurascities will always hear the voices of caution, the
voices pointing to the trade-offs, and the voices of
self-interest when deciding whether to go to war.
Societies should become more internally stable as
plurascitic conflicts spread through them with the
breakdown of monopolies. Furthermore, the richer they
become in plurascitic conflict, the more they will become the
engines of their own progress. Instead of importing
knowledge from more advanced states, a plurascity
generates knowledge locally through competition. The
example in support of these assertions is the history of the
United States.
The United States has become a plurascity from its
beginnings as 13 relatively homogeneous and monopolistic
colonies. Government is split among three levels plus many
special governmental districts, each competing for the tax
dollar and in giving service. Religious denominations have
spread across the country to the point that few areas are not
served by more than one church, creating competition for
both service and parishioners. Businesses have multiplied,
virtually eliminating even at the local level the monopolies
of old. The company town is gone, and the local bank has
competition. This level of competition, and the growth in
knowledge that competition brings, I suggest, is the reason
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this country is as stable as it has been. Change has been
constant and incremental. The big shocks that have brought
other countries to their knees have been passing
phenomena here. Governments have fallen in other
countries as a consequence of financial and energy shocks
that the United States has survived.
ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5
1. Ted Honderich, The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, New York:
Oxford University, 1995.
2. The insufficiency of pluralism as a descriptor of democracy may be
assumed from the fact that Robert Dahl, pluralism’s most dedicated
student, has moved on to the concept of poliarchy as a better descriptor.
See Endnote 1, Chapter 1.
3. Plurascity may be compared to the competing factions John
Madison discusses in The Federalist Papers, No. 10, New York: Mentor,
1961, p. 77. Both models subscribe to the idea that factions cannot be
prevented from arising. Both argue that control of factions comes
through having many factions that become counterweights to each
other. Neither model restricts factions to a single sector of life. Madison,
however, has his factions acting directly on government, lobbying for
their positions. I see the process as being more indirect. Our
participation in society, as part of a congregation, as a consumer and
producer, in social and civic gatherings all have primary purposes that
are typically not political. Our participation in an activity strengthens
that activity, increasing its power in the marketplace and bringing it to
the attention of government. Thus, we buy a computer with Microsoft
software. Microsoft gains market share. Government sees a growing,
prosperous company and is, therefore, less likely to interfere in that
marketplace, unless of course the issue of monopolistic practice is
raised. Ignoring the monopoly issue, the personal computer (PC)
industry can get government assistance for export or other reasons
without much of an effort. Fundamentalist and evangelical churches
are getting more attention from government because these are the
growing denominations. My point, in a nutshell, is that buying a
computer or belonging to a congregation is ultimately a political action.
It is an action that has a much greater effect on government than does
any election. In some countries, it is also a dangerous action. Another
point on Madison: Larry D. Kramer argues that The Federalist, No. 10
was largely ignored until this century. While we might see it as
determinative on the structure of the young United States, evidence
Kramer collects from the notes of the participants at the convention
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indicates that when he was not ignored on these arguments, he was
misquoted. See Larry D. Kramer, “Madison’s Audience” in Harvard
Law Review, January 1999.
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CHAPTER 6
THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN
PRE- AND POST-HOSTILITY CAMPAIGNS

The achievement of plurascity in any of the states
discussed above is a difficult chore, but an achievable goal.
The military of intervening states will have major roles in
bringing warring factions to the truce table and from there
to a stable and progressive future. If the history of previous
wars and operations other than war, especially in the
Balkans, teaches humanity anything, it should be that a
cessation of hostilities on the battlefield is just the first step
toward peace. The intervening military in the Balkans
today and other areas of ethnic or nationalistic tension
tomorrow, or anytime tin-pot dictators use their people as
cannon fodder, will face differing situations when they
arrive.
Post-Hostilities Intervention.
In a homogeneous, single-ethnic Kosovo, the
post-hostilities task is nation-building. The occupation of
Japan may be taken as the model for this type of operation.
Demobilization is step one. Foreign aid agencies cannot do
this. The second step is maintenance of order. Examples
such as Haiti, where a civilian police force was introduced to
perform this task, suggest that the military will be taking on
this task for a longer duration than in the past. The third
task, actual development of a new state, requires a military
presence to prevent factional fighting among groups
seeking to assume control of the country.
Earlier, reference was made to a strategy to prevent the
re-arousal of nationalistic forces by concentrating
development at the local level. The purpose for this is to
allow development of governance that is more pragmatic
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than the pre-hostilities governance. This assumes that a
military governor has been put in place to manage the
nation-building task. That manager needs to have a heavy
club in the closet for moving former combatants into
peaceful roles. That club is the military, on the ground, with
a very obvious presence. The club does not have to be large,
just flexible and available for instant action.
The club must be much larger and out on patrol in a
multi-ethnic, post-hostilities Bosnia. In this type of
situation the intervening military is the only force strong
enough to keep ethnic warfare from re-igniting. This is a
long-term task. Only after plurascitic conflict is
well-established, when neighbor sells shoes to neighbor, can
this military force claim a job well done.
In the simplest of terms, the transition from the
cessation of hostilities to a stable peace must begin with an
occupation by an external military force in both locations.
The local people have no business setting up a national
government—by election or otherwise—until the hatreds
that spawned the initial fighting have had their salience
reduced. In short, the KLA in Kosovo must be told that they
did not win the war—the intervening military did that.
Words with force attached must be used to turn combatants
to the immediate tasks of reconstruction and reestablishment of local life. Once that is accomplished, and people
again have something to lose, then the transition can take a
more civilian character.
In both of the above scenarios the military logistics
capability plays a major role. Only the military has in place
the management capability to ensure that civilian
populations will have shelter and food in the coming
dangerous season—winter in Europe, or the dry/wet season
elsewhere. The logistics arm becomes the carrot that
balances the stick on the street or the closet in the campaign
to move the local population beyond sectarian hatred.
Hatreds cannot be eliminated. How can one teach
another who has lost family members to the slaughter by
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the enemy to stop hating? One cannot. One can help the
individual rebuild or build a life in the present by becoming
re-engaged with society. That cannot be accomplished in a
refugee camp with its many hours of idleness. If necessary,
the occupying military power can organize and manage
work groups to rebuild homes, infrastructure and
institutions as part of the rehabilitation process.
So, the initial task in nation-building in a Kosovo, Haiti,
and other situations where hatred or uncertainties are at
high levels is to contain the hatred and then to make it less
salient in the people’s lives. There will never be a battalion
of psychologists sent into such situations, even if there is a
chance of them being successful. The task of containing
hatred and then of beginning the task of turning it into
positive energy is a military task. Danger is high and many,
especially the wartime leadership, will not want to do so.
Local development is one avenue where these energies can
be turned.
Pre-Hostilities Intervention.
The situation in Macedonia represents a contrasting
scenario to the post-hostilities examples of Bosnia and
Kosovo. Here killing has not yet begun; the mission is
prevention today and in the long run. Surprisingly, the
model for preventing war in Macedonia may be NATO’s role
in Europe. NATO has had two missions in the past: one, to
counter Soviet expansionism; and two, to unify Western
Europe as a counter-weight to the Soviet Union. Soviet
expansionism was halted, so one may say that NATO has
been a success. Looking a little more closely on the ground
might leave a different conclusion. The two major Western
continental powers have certainly been at cross purposes as
often as not in the history of NATO. France has gone it alone
for much of the period since 1949. Only outside of NATO
could it have an independent voice in world affairs.
Germany, on the other hand, has been very unassertive in
the alliance. Thus, it came as a shock when a suddenly
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assertive Germany was the first country to recognize one of
broken-off pieces of Yugoslavia, Croatia. This pattern
suggests that western containment of the Soviet Union may
have been due more to American and English steadfastness
and the continuing occupation of Western Europe by the
United States, than concerted NATO readiness.
Nevertheless, NATO is a good model for reduction of
tensions in Macedonia in that encamped foreign troops can
provide the various groups confidence that the killing will
not start. In a sense, it is the same security NATO has given
Europe vis à vis Germany. Military involvement is the only
possible guarantee in such situations. On the nonmilitary
front, Macedonia represents the same kind of an integration
problem the United States faced in the 1940-70s in race
relations. The national government must take the lead
while the external powers support and advise it.
Europe struggles still to achieve political integration.
Results to date are not as far reaching as the level of
integration the United States has achieved in race
relations. The European Union (EU), with the common
currency, may be an answer.
While we worry about one corner of Europe today, the
Balkans, we might consider that plurascitic behavior is not
in abundance across all of Europe. It would seem that
beginning with the French Revolution, Europe has been in
an almost constant state of war with a few pauses. The
commonality in all the wars fought in Europe during this
period has been that one side or both were advocating a
non-plurascitic solution to the world’s problems. The
French have been seeking an egalitarian utopia. German
nationalism is a constant from the Franco-Prussian War,
the War-to-End-All-Wars, and World War II. Rigidities or
monopolies are common in Europe. Examples include large
issues such as French stateism, where the far-away
government controls all—including taking the country to
war. They also include small issues such as German blue
laws limiting when stores can be open or when a homeowner
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can mow the lawn. From small to large, these rigidities—a
little different in each state—make the unification of
Europe a more than difficult project. Neither the German
nor French want to give up their rigidities—cultural
habits—in favor of those of the other.
The true end to the long-running German-French war
will come with the rise of multinational combinations
within Europe; at the level of business and civic mergers
and in the biggest merger of them all, the EU.
Unfortunately, the EU appears to be building bureaucratic
monopolies to replace cultural and national monopolies/
traditions. This contrasts sharply with the manner in which
the United States came together. The colonies trusted each
other so little that they initially gave the central
government no power. Even today, the internal power of the
central government in the United States is still far less than
that of European governments. The comprehensive and
stringent regulatory schema being assembled for the EU
leaves little room for the application of new knowledge and
the growth of freedom. The EU will not long survive, never
mind flourish, if rigidities in governance remain in place.
The American occupation of Western Europe will not
end soon given the more truce-like character of European
governance and the lack of true peace.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION

I asked two questions at the beginning of the discussion
of the Context of Peace. Now is the time to review whether
the questions have been answered.
The first question was: What should be the objective of
this military involvement? The answer to this question is
simple, yet it has built-in complexity. It is simple in that
everyone accepts the purpose of intervention as
establishment of something beyond the status quo ante. The
United States did not occupy Germany and Japan to return
them to their imperialistic ways. Neither have the U.N.,
NATO or the United States intervened in places such as
Haiti, Bosnia, or Kosovo to reestablish in power the
preexisting governing elites. The goal has been to establish
democracy.
Unfortunately, as Robert Dahl amply documents (see
Endnote 1, Chapter 1), democracy is not a very well-defined
term. Countries that are counted as democracies share few
central values. Some countries elect dictators
(Kazakhstan), while others allow leaders to become
dictators (Peru). Still others, many parliamentary
countries, elect Prime Ministers who are, in effect,
temporary dictators (England). After World War II, the
United States tried to impose democratic institutions and
mores in Germany and Japan. By some measures, e.g.,
elections, we have been successful in doing so. By other
measures, however, the result has been more equivocal.
Much of the pre-war elite is still active in ruling these
countries. Institutions such as Deutsche Bank, Krupps, and
Mitsubishi continue to dominate these countries.
Such elites exist in all countries. If their influence is to be
minimized, then intervention must be designed to break up
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the monopolies that they represent. Holding elections in
Bosnia so soon after the Dayton Accords were signed was
probably not the way to achieve this end. The only group
well enough organized to campaign in that election was the
group involved in prosecuting the war against the Serbians.
Their reason for existence is their high ideological
commitment, not necessarily a plus for a post-hostilities
government that should move beyond that conflict.
The need to overcome pre-intervention monopolies is a
part of the question raised above and the second question on
the determinants of a successful intervention. Given the
weaknesses inherent in the concept of democracy, I have
suggested the concept of plurascity as a replacement. The
process of fostering a plurascity is much more straightforward than the process of installing democracy. There are
two plurascitic catchphrases: eliminate monopolies and
encourage competition. One initiative recommended for
post-hostilities use in military operations other than war is
the establishment of fully functioning local governments.
Independent local government with its own sphere of
influence is a rare thing in the world. Most countries have
one government, the national government, that reaches all
the way down to the local level. The beauty in setting up all
these governments is that they can compare their
performance against that of their neighbors: the beginning
of competition. Furthermore, they can serve as a training
ground for more pragmatic political leaders. Once these
governments are functioning, then comes the time to think
about regional or national governments.
Unfortunately, the elites that “won” the war—ignoring
the effect of the intervening powers—will want to assume
power right at the conclusion of hostilities. Preventing them
from doing so is a military task that is a part of
demobilization. Unlike civil administrations, the
intervening military force has the power to accomplish this
task without compromise.

54

The second question I asked was: What is the measure of
the end-state that permits military disengagement with
confidence that a repeat of the military/humanitarian
campaign will not be necessary? All monopolies that are
disabled as part of the occupation count as positives in this
regard. Also to be counted as positives are the creation of
competitive situations where none existed in the past (e.g.,
local vs. national government; independent smaller utility
companies vs. one large state-owned utility). But is there an
absolute endpoint to this process that guarantees the
prevention of future conflicts?
Preventing the hostilities leadership from automatically
becoming the post-conflict leadership without a contest is
perhaps the best message the intervening force can send to
the rest of the world. Potential conflicts may be forestalled if
it is known that an intervening force will stay around long
enough for the development of competition for leadership in
the post-hostilities phase. The hostilities leadership will
always have the credential that it “won” the war. Sufficient
time must be allowed to pass to permit the struggle for
leadership to once again become competitive. Others must
have the opportunity to develop a resumé of accomplishments. Reestablishing local life in an area certainly would
qualify as a strong credential.
The intervening force will go home sometime. If it leaves
right after the end of hostilities, then the conflict will surely
re-ignite. The initial military occupation should remain in
place long enough to demobilize the combatants and to
prevent establishment of a de facto national government.
Once these tasks are accomplished, and the population has
been turned to the task of reestablishing local life through
reconstruction, then the occupation role may be
transitioned to a civilian governor.
At a minimum, economic activity should resume before
the transition to a national government. One element to be
avoided, of course, is that newly installed government will

55

try to fill an economic vacuum with state or crony-run
businesses.
The civilian governor can extend local government to the
national level once local and national life has been
established. If we are to assign any sanctity to elections,
however, then the governor’s tenure ends with the
installation of a newly elected national government.
All this suggests that military disengagement can begin
after local development is well underway; that is, when
community level life has been reestablished, local
government is functioning, and businesses and other
community institutions have started operations. At this
point in time, the people should have a sufficient investment
in their new lives to minimize the probability that they will
rearm and head for the hills.
The elements of plurascitic life will be visible now.
Communities will be able to see how neighboring
communities are handling reconstruction. Businesses may
be one to a community but residents will be able to go to the
next village if the local merchant is not responsive. Parents
in one community will be able to assess the quality of schools
by visiting the next town. In short, local level development
or redevelopment will bring considerable information down
to the level of the individual. That information becomes
knowledge when acted upon. The actions, in turn, create
freedom—the freedom of making decisions and accomplishing results.
Complete military disengagement depends on a number
of factors. One of the most important is the quality of the
civilian police force that is installed. Combat troops should
not be removed until a police force has been demonstrated to
be competent and effective. Engineering troops may need to
remain throughout the external civilian government term
to provide quality assurance as the infrastructure is
replaced. A single concept that might encompass the point
in time when military disengagement is warranted may be
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the comfort of women in their ability to meet their families’
needs.
Such a measure should indicate that the reconstructed
environment is now rich enough in knowledge to permit
comparisons among goods and services. That is also a
measure of the degree of plurascity introduced into the
environment.

57

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

MANFRED K. ROTERMUND is engaged in federal
government contract work through his company,
Crossroads Research, Ltd. He currently supports several
Department of Defense agencies in the area of information
technology program management. In the past he has done
both computer system development and policy analysis for a
range of civilian and military agencies. He has taught
psychology and research methods at the undergraduate and
graduate level. After graduating from college, Mr.
Rotermund spent 1967-69 in Laos teaching English at
teacher training schools and a lycee. Thereafter, he
obtained an M.S. in Social Psychology from the University
of Massachusetts.

59

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE
Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.
Commandant
*****
STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE
Interim Director
Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.
Author
Dr. Manfred K. Rotermund
Director of Publications and Production
Ms. Marianne P. Cowling
Publications Assistant
Ms. Rita A. Rummel
*****
Composition
Mrs. Mary Jane Semple
Cover Artist
Mr. James E. Kistler

